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TRANSPLANT JUSTICE?:
THE EFFICACY OF A PURELY COMMON LAW
CONCEPT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL FORUM
Theresa Marie Clark*
I. INTRODUCTION

In Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et. al. ("Sikirica Case"), defendants
Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dogen and Dragen Kolundlija pleaded guilty to persecution, the crime against humanity criminalized in article 5(h) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Statute (ICTY
Statute). 1 At the Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that the
defendants' guilty pleas were valid under article 15 of the ICTY Statute and
rule 62 bis of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). 2 In
addition, although the Court used no algebraic formula to determine the
exact mitigation value of a guilty plea, it recognized the defendants' guilty
pleas as valid mitigating factors in their sentence determinations.'
Utilizing the Sikirica Case as a catalyst, this paper focuses on the
admissibility of guilty pleas in the international criminal context and cursorily on the proper procedural framework for this concept. In addition, it
addresses the validity of allowing such pleas to mitigate a defendant's sentence. Part II outlines the relevant proceedings of the Sikirica Case.4 Part
III first, addresses the common law concept of guilty pleas and the use of
* J.D., Washington University, forthcoming May 2003; Hague Academy of International Law, Public International Law Session, 2002; B.S., Duquesne University,
1998. The author extends her sincerest thanks to her mentor, Professor Leila
Nadya Sadat for her inspiration, her guidance, and her demand for excellence.
I Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, [ 39
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001). See also Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunalfor Former Yugoslavia, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to para. 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993)) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The complete text of the ICTY Statute is available at http://www.un.org/icty/ (last visited April 9, 2003).
2
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
4449 (ICTY Trial Chamber Ill, 13 Nov. 2001).
3 Id. 11. 149-151, 193, 228.
4 The intent of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Sikirica Case. In particular, the Trial Chamber's Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, and its discussion of other mitigating factors, as well as its account for the
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such pleas as a mitigating factor; second, treats the advent of admitting the
common law concept of guilty pleas into the ICTY, the procedural framework established in response, and subsequent developments; third, evaluates the guilty plea procedures of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR); and finally, explains the progressive approach of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Part IV reviews the outcome of the Sikirica
Case through a detailed analysis of the Trial Chamber's use of precedent
and the persuasiveness of the opinion. Finally, Part V concludes by addressing the compatibility of guilty pleas and their use in sentence mitigation with the goals of the ICTY, and evaluates how the compromise struck
by the drafters of the Rome Statute with respect to guilty pleas provides
judges in the ICC with the tools to ensure adherence to the ICC's primary
goals.
II.

PROSECUTOR V. SIKIRICA, ET AL.

The Sikirica Case arose out of the events occurring at the Keraterm
Camp located in the municipality of Prijedor in north-western Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 5 Prijedor, with a population consisting of roughly 44% Muslims, 42% Serbs, 5.6% Croats, 5.5% Yugoslavs, and 2.1% other ethnic
groups, 6 is situated on one of the main east-west travel corridors in the
former Yugoslavia. 7 In 1991 after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia and war broke out, 8 Bosnian Serb leaders attempted
to hold Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Yugoslav federation. 9 However,
recognizing the nascent disintegration of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, Serb
leaders began to carve a separate Serbian territory out of Bosnia and Herzegravity of the crime and aggravating circumstances in determining the accuseds'
sentences are not detailed herein.
5 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, . 239
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
6 These percentages represent the status of the Prijedor population according to
the 1991 government census. 2D GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION:
THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL; THE CASES-PART I 81 (J. Oppenheim & W. van der
Wolf eds. 1999)[hereinafter
7

GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION].

GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION, supra note

6, at 80.

For a detailed historical account of the Yugoslav Conflict, see GLOBAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION, supra note 6, vol. II a, at 11-90 and vol. II d, at 5995. On the Yugoslav Conflict and the development of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, see generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN
8

JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE
NUREMBERG

9

(1997).

GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION,

supra note 6, at 61.
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govina, and in March 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence.' 0 The Bosnian Serb leaders of the newly independent Bosnia and
Herzegovina considered the substantial Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
population a significant problem and immediately initiated a campaign to
11
remove them from the area.
Prijedor became a strategic location in this vie for a Serbian territory because it linked the Serbian-dominated area of the Croatian Krajina in
the west with the Republic of Serbia in the east. 12 Thus, Bosnian Serb
forces seized Prijedor on 30 April 1992.13 After the seizure, the Serbs imposed restrictions on the Bosnian Muslims', Bosnian Croats' and some
other non-Serbs' freedom of movement and right to employment, in effect
confining them to their specific areas of the municipality. 14 In late May,
Serb military, paramilitary, and police forces began attacking these areas.'-'
The Serbs apprehended all survivors and transferred them to camps and
detention facilities under the direction and control of Bosnian Serb authorities. 16 Between 24 May 1992 and 30 August 1992, Serb leaders unlawfully
segregated and detained more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian
Croats, and other non-Serbs in the Omarska, 17 Trnopolje, 18 and Keraterm
Camps.19

Id. at 65-66.
11 Id. at 83-95.
12 Id. at 80.
10

13
14

Id. at 84.
Id. at 83-95.

Id.
Id.
17 The Omarska Camp held military-aged males and political, economic, social,
and intellectual leaders of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population. Id.
At this camp, severe beatings, torture, killings, sexual assaults, and inhumane conditions were prevalent. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Krocka, et al., (Case No. IT-9830/1) Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber I, 2 Nov. 2001).
18 The Tmopolje Camp held mostly Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat women,
15
16

children and elderly but some military men were detained there. GLOBAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION, supra note 6, at 89-95. Rape, sexual assaults and
torture of both the women and girls occurred regularly by camp personnel and
others. Id.
19 See Id., for a detailed description of these camps and the atrocities committed
there.
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The Keraterm Camp was located in a former two-story ceramics
factory. 20 The bottom level of the factory contained four large rooms labeled as one, two, three and four.2' This camp housed predominately military-age males. 22 The brutal and inhumane conditions of the camp resultedin the physical debilitation or death of the detainees. 23 The detainees could
not sit or lie down due to overcrowding, 24 and they were given starvation
rations only one time per day. 25 Few toilets or personal hygiene facilities
were provided, and guards often refused to allow their use. 26 Detainees
resorted to relieving themselves in bags and barrels. 27 Detainees received
28
no changes of clothing, bedding, and with rare exception, medical care.
Daily, the Serbs interrogated the detainees, and these interrogations routinely included severe beatings and torture. 29 In addition, on a regular basis
indiscriminate beatings, torture, killings, sexual assaults, and other forms of
physical and psychological abuse occurred.30 The Room three massacre
constituted the most heinous and violent of the events at Keraterm. On 24
July, 1992, the guards of the Keraterm Camp gassed and gunned down the
Room three detainees, killing between one hundred sixty and two hundred
31
men.
Dusko Sikirica held the position of camp commander at Keraterm,
32
and as such, had superior authority over the camp and its conditions.
Damir Dogen and Dragen Kolundija were shift commanders there, and
thus, when present in the camp held positions of superior authority over all
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, . 52
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
20

21

Id. . 53.

22

Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-T) Judgment on Defense Mo-

tions To Acquit, . 80 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 3 Sept. 2001).
23

Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,

.

51-103 (ICTY Trial Chamber 1II, 13 Nov. 2001).
24

Witnesses testified that on average Keraterm Camp housed one thousand two

hundred people in the four rooms. Id. The rooms ranged from six to twenty meters
in width and eight to twenty meters in length, and that at any given time they
contained roughly two to five hundred detainees. Id. In. 53-64.
25 Id.
. 70-73.
26 Id.
. 68-69.
27 Id.
28 Id.
. 67-74.
29 Id.
. 79-83.
30 Id.
. 84-100.
31 Id. [ . 101-103.
32 Id. [[. 118-119.
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camp personnel (other than the commander). 33 Sikirica, as well as Dogen
and Kolundlija when on duty, had the authority to alter the conditions of
the camp3 4 and the authority to control the conduct of the guards in the
camp. 3 5 However, all three failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them from murdering, beating, torturing, harassing, and
humiliating the detainees or to punish the perpetrators. 36 Moreover, all
three instigated, committed, and otherwise aided and abetted in the persecutions of the detainees through direct participation and through instigation,
approval, encouragement, acquiescence, and assistance in the development
37
and continuation of the conditions of the camp and the on-going crimes.
Finally, the Room Three massacre allegedly occurred while Kolundlija was
38
acting shift commander.
On 21 July 1995, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed indictments
against Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dogen, and Dragen Kolundlija for offenses
committed at the Keraterm Camp between 24 May 1992 and 31 August
1992. 39 The Tribunal obtained custody over the accused between June 1999
and July 2000.40 With respect to all three accused, the Office of the ProseId. 11. 153-154, 200-201.
See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
35 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
117-230 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
36 Id.
33

34

37

.

Id.

Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-PT) Second Amended Indictment, [ 43 (ICTY, 3 Jan. 2001). Trial Chamber III found that the Room Three
massacre did in fact occur. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S)
Sentencing Judgment, 9N 101-103 (ICTY Trial Chamber I1, 13 Nov. 2001). However, it is unclear from the sentencing judgment whether this event occurred during
Kolundija's shift. Id. In 200-220.
39 Id. 1. The original indictment named ten other accused as well, but Judge
Vohrah, sitting in the Pre-Trial Chamber granted leave to withdraw the charges
against five of those ten in May 1998. Moreover, in November 1998 the charges
against Zoran igie were incorporated into the indictment of Prosecutor v. Kvocka,
et al., (Case No. IT-98-30/1) Order Granting Leave to File an Amended Indictment
and Confirming the Amended Indictment (ICTY Pre-Trial Chamber, 9 Nov. 1998).
Id. at 1 n. 1. Thus, the final amended indictment named the above three defendants,
as well as Dusan Fustar, Nenad Abanovic, Predrag Banovic and Dusko Knezevic.
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-PT) Second Amended Indictment
(ICTY, 3 Jan. 2001).
40 Id. NATO-led Stabilization Forces ("SFOR") apprehended Dragen Kolund-ija,
and transferred him to the ICTY on 7 June 1999. NATO-led peace force arrests
two Serb war crime suspects - Tanjug, Tanjug News Agency, Belgrade, June 7,
38
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cutor (OTP) alleged both individual and superior responsibility, pursuant to
article 7, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the ICTY Statute respectively. 41
The OTP indicted Sikirica on nine charges of genocide, 42 violations
1999, reprinted in

BRITISH

BROADCASTING

CORPORATION,

BBC

SUMMARY

OF

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Secondary Legal Publications Group File. SFOR forces arrested Damir Dogen, and transferred him to the
ICTY on 25 October 1999. Robert MacPherson, Bosnian War Crimes Suspect
nabbed: NATO, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 25, 1999, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Secondary Legal Publications Group File. On 25 June 2000, SFOR
forces arrested Dusko Sikirica and transferred him to the ICTY. Bosnian Serb War
Crimes Suspect Arrested, SRNA News Agency, Bijeljina, June 27, 2000, reprinted
WORLD BROADCASTS,

in BRITISH
CASTS,

BROADCASTING

CORPORATION,

BBC

SUMMARY

OF WORLD

BROAD-

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Secondary Legal Publications Group

File.
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-PT) Second Amended Indictment,
16-17 (ICTY, 3 Jan. 2001). Under article 7(1), an accused incurs individual criminal responsibility for the planning, instigating, ordering, committing or
otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any of
the acts or omissions criminalized in articles 2-5 of the ICTY Statute. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1). Under article 7(3), a person in a position of superior
authority is responsible for the criminal acts of his subordinates, if the superior
authority knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit
such acts, or had done so, and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the subordinates. Id. art. 7(3).
42 Article 4 of the ICTY Statute criminalizes genocide. ICTY Statute, supra note
1, art. 4. (Article 4 provides:
41

1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of
this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated
in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
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of the laws or customs of war,43 and crimes against humanity. 44 Specifically, Sikirica was charged with: genocide and complicity to commit genocide; 45 violations of the laws or customs of war of outrages upon personal
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide).
43 Article 3 of the ICTY Statute criminalizes this offense. ICTY Statute, supra
note 1, art.3. (Article 3 provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property).
44 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, [ 4
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 November 2001). Article 5 of the ICTY Statute
criminalizes crimes against humanity. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 5. (Article
5 provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for the following crimes when committed in an armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against a civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) inhumane acts.).
45 These charges of genocide are set out in Counts 1 and 2 of the Second
Amended Indictment. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-PT) Second
Amended Indictment, Counts 1-2,
26-34 (ICTY, 3 Jan. 2001).
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dignity and murder or, in the alternative, cruel treatment; 46 and the crimes
against humanity of persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds,
inhumane acts and murder, 47 or in the alternative, inhumane acts. 48 On 7
49
July 2000, Sikirica pleaded not guilty to all charges.
The OTP indicted Dogen on seven charges of violations of the laws
or customs of war and crimes against humanity. 50 Specifically, Dogen was
charged with: outrages upon personal dignity, torture, and cruel treatment
constituting violations of the laws or customs of war; 5 1 and persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds, inhumane acts, and torture constituting
crimes against humanity. 2 He pleaded not guilty to all charges at his initial
53
appearance on 8 November 1999.
The OTP indicted Kolund~ija on five charges of violations of the
laws and customs of war and crimes against humanity. 54 Specifically, he
was charged with outrages upon personal dignity, and murder constituting
violations of the laws or customs of war;5 5 and persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds, inhumane acts and murder constituting crimes
against humanity.5 6 At his initial appearance, Kolundlija raised issues reThese charges of violations of the laws or customs of war are set out in Counts
35-42, 44.
5, 9, and 11 of the Second Amended Indictment. Id. Counts 5, 9, 11,
47 These charges of crimes against humanity are set out in Counts 3, 4, and 8 of
the Second Amended Indictment. Id. Counts 3, 4, 8, [ 35-42, 44.
44.
48 Id. Count 10,
49 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
4
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
50 , Id.
3.
51 These charges of violations of the laws or customs of war are set out in Counts
5, 13 and 15 of the Second Amended Indictment. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al.,
(Case No. IT-95-8-PT) Second Amended Indictment, Counts 5, 13, 15, In 42, 45
(ICTY, 3 Jan. 2001).
52 These charges of crimes against humanity are set out in Counts 3, 4, 14, 12
42, 45.
respectively. Id. Counts 3, 4, 12, 14,
53 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
3
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
54 Id. 2.
55 These charges of violations of the laws or customs of war are set out in Counts
5 and 7 of the Second Amended Indictment respectively. Prosecutorv. Sikirica, et
al. (Case No. IT-95-8-PT) Second Amended Indictment, Counts 5, 7, [ 42-43
(ICTY, 3 Jan. 2001).
56 These charges are set out in Counts 3, 4 and 6 of the Second Amended Indict42-43.
ment respectively. Id. Counts 3, 4, 6,
46
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garding his identity, and thus, did not enter a plea.5 7 However, after an
evidentiary hearing on 24 June 1999, the Trial Chamber held that
Kolund~ija was the person named in the indictment, and on 13 July 1999,
Kolundlija pleaded not guilty to all charges. 58
The defendants made several preliminary motions objecting to the
form of the indictment, which resulted in a second amended indictment
filed by the OTP on 3 January 2001. 59 On 19 March 2001, trial commenced. 60 The OTP completed its case in thirty-three sitting days, calling
thirty-four witnesses and relying on the transcripts of testimony from six
witnesses in previous proceedings. 6' At the close of the OTP's case, all
three defendants moved for acquittal. 62 On 27 June 2001, the Trial Chamber granted Sikirica's motion to acquit with respect to Counts 1 and 2 of the
Indictment, genocide and complicity to commit genocide. 63 Additionally,
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, [ 2
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 5. Specifically, Kolund~ija and Dogen, who were arrested prior to Sikirica, objected to the form and specificity of the OTP's indictment and attachments
arguing that it did not provide the requisite level of specificity under the ICTY
Statute, article 18 and rule 47(c) of the ICTY rules of procedure and evidence.
Prosecutor v. Dogen and Kolund~ija, (Case No. IT-95-8) Decision on Preliminary
Motions,
7-17 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 10 Feb. 2000). On 10 February 2000,
the Trial Chamber in its Decision on Preliminary Motions struck all but one objection, and ordered the OTP to amend the indictment's confidential attachment. The
Trial Chamber instructed the OTP to provide more detail on the alleged capacity of
each accused's involvement and the alleged level of each accused's responsibility-whether direct or superior. Id. The OTP filed the amended attachment, and
Dogen then argued that this attachment went beyond the scope of the indictment
itself. Id. The dispute was ultimately settled by an agreement between the parties
resulting in the Second Amended Indictment. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case
No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, 5 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
60 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
9
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
61
Id. Rule 92 bis of the ICTY rules of procedure and evidence permits admitting
such testimony. Rules of Procedureand Evidence for the InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.22, rule 92 bis (13 Dec.
2001), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32 rev22.htm#%2062%
20bis> (last visited Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY RPE].
62 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, 1 10
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
63 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-T) Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, 11 113-115, 135-150, 165-171 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 3 Sept.
57
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the Trial Chamber dismissed Counts 12 to 15 of the Indictment, charging
the crimes against humanity of torture, cruel treatment, and inhumane acts,
against Dogen.64 The Trial Chamber denied the remainder of the motions to
65
acquit.
From 27 June to 5 July 2001 in five sitting days, defense counsel
presented its case on behalf of Sikirica, calling fifteen witnesses and asserting an alibi defense. 66 From 16 to 30 July 2001 in eight sitting days, defense counsel presented its case on behalf of Dogen, calling sixteen
witnesses. 67 Kolundlija, on the other hand, sought a postponement pending
the issuance of the written Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, and
then on 31 August 2001, Kolund~ija and the OTP in a joint submission
informed the Trial Chamber of an agreement reached between the parties. 68
The agreement stipulated that Kolundlija would plead guilty to Count 3, the
crime against humanity of persecution, in exchange for a withdrawal of all
other charges. 69 On 4 September 2001, Kolunidja formally entered a plea
of guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment, and the OTP formally withdrew the
remaining charges of violations of the laws or customs of war and crimes
against humanity. 70 On 7 September 2001, both Sikirica and Dogen in a
joint submission with the OTP informed the Trial Chamber that they had
reached the same agreement, and on 19 September 2001, Sikirica and
2001). The Trial Chamber held that the prosecution failed to establish the specific
intent required by article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute, "to destroy in whole or in part a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. Id. Specifically, the Trial
Chamber held that intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat
group could not be inferred because the evidence did not establish that a significant
number of Bosnian Muslims or Croats were victims, nor that a significant section
of the group, such as its leadership were targeted. Id.
75, 84-86. The Trial
Chamber further held that the evidence did not establish that Sikirica possessed the
specific intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat groups, because
individual members, not the group itself, were targeted. Id. 90.
64 Id. 134. The OTP conceded, and the Trial Chamber held, that the evidence
connecting Dogen to the incident in question (the beating of detainees from Room 2
of Keraterm Camp on 25 June 1992) was only exculpatory in nature. Id. Thus, the
Trial Chamber acquitted Dogen on Counts 12-15. Id.
65 Id.
113-115, 135-150, 165-171.
66 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, I 11
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
67 Id.
68 Id. [12.
69 Id.
70 Id. For a list of the charges withdrawn by the OTP, see supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
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Dogen pleaded guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment. 71 The OTP formally
withdrew all remaining charges, 72 and the Trial Chamber, accepting their
73
pleas, entered findings of guilt.
At the Sentencing Judgment, the Trial Chamber held that the defendants' guilty pleas were valid under article 15 of ICTY Statute74 and rule
62 bis of the ICTY's RPE. 75 The Trial Chamber reasoned that as required
by Rule 62 bis the defendant's pleas were voluntary, informed and unequivocal, and that "there [was] a sufficient factual basis for the crime[s] and
[each] accused's participation in those crimes." 76
The Trial Chamber sentenced Dusko Sikirica to fifteen years imprisonment, 77 Damir Dogen to five years imprisonment,78 and Dragen
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
1415 (ICTY Trial Chamber 111, 13 Nov. 2001).
72 For a list of the charges the OTP withdrew, see supra notes 42-48, 50-52 and
accompanying text.
73 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
1415 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
74 Article 15 requires the judges of the ICTY to adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for "conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals,
the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters." ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 15.
75 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
4449 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001). Rule 62 bis establishes the framework
for the Trial Chambers evaluation and acceptance of a guilty plea as valid. ICTY
RPE, supra, note 61, rule 62 bis. Specifically, Rule 62 bis requires that:
71

If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or
requests to change his or her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber
is satisfied that:
(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;
(ii) the guilty plea is informed;
(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and
(iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused's participation in it, either on the basis of independent
indicia or on lack of any material disagreement between the
parties about the facts of the case, the Trial Chamber may
enter a finding of guilt and instruct the Registrar to set a date
for the sentencing hearing.
Id.
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, q 4449 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
77 Id. 235. The OTP recommended a sentence between ten and seventeen years
imprisonment to the Trial Chamber. See Status of Cases Page, United Nations
76
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Kolund~ija to three years imprisonment.79 Pursuant to article 24 of the
ICTY Statute 80 and rule 101 of the ICTY's RPE, 81 the Trial Chamber recogwebsite for the ICTY, at www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm (last visited April 9,
2003).
78 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, 239
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001). The OTP recommended a sentence between five and seven years imprisonment to the Trial Chamber. See Status of
Cases Page, United Nations website for the ICTY, at www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm (last visited April 9, 2003).
79 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, 243
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001). The OTP recommended a sentence between three and five years imprisonment to the Trial Chamber. See Status of Cases
Page, United Nations website for the ICTY, at www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm
(April 9, 2003).
80 ICTY Statue, supra note 1, art. 24. Article 24 on penalties provides:
1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited
to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment,
the Trial Chmabers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia.
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers shall take into
account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person.
3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order
the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal
conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful
owners.
Id. (emphasis added).
81 ICTY RPE, supra note 61, rule 101. Rule 101 on penalties provides:
(A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person's life.
(B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take
into account the factors mentioned in article 24, 2, of the
Statute, as well as such factors as:
(i) any aggravating circumstances;
(ii) any mitigating circumstances including the substantial
cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction;
(iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia;
(iv) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of
any State on the convicted person for the same act has
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nized the defendants' guilty pleas as valid mitigating factors in their sentence determination. 82 The Trial Chamber reasoned that a guilty plea
facilitates the work of the ICTY in two ways. 83 First, entering a plea of
guilty prior to commencement of trial saves the ICTY the time and effort of
an extensive investigation and trial.84 Second, regardless of the timing, a
guilty plea facilitates the ICTY's truth-finding function, one of the ICTY's
fundamental objectives. 85 As such, the Trial Chamber held that pleading
guilty entitles the defendant to some credit towards mitigation regardless of
its timing. 86 However, the Chamber held that defendants who plead guilty
prior to the commencement of trial should receive "full credit for that plea,"
while defendants pleading guilty any time thereafter only stand to receive
partial credit. 87 Thus, the Trial Chamber afforded Kolund~ija "close to full
credit" for entering his guilty plea at the close of the prosecution's case, and
granted Sikirica and Dogen "some credit" despite the lateness of their
88
pleas.
Sikirica and Dogen are currently serving their sentences in the
ICTY Detention Unit located at The Hague in The Netherlands awaiting
already been served as referred to in article 10, paragraph 3 of the Statute.
(C) Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period,
if any, during which the convicted person was detained in
custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or
appeal.
Id. (emphasis added).
82 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
[
149-151, 193, 228 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001). Pursuant to ICTY
article 24 and RPE rule 101, the Trial Chamber also recognized the defendants'
remorse as a mitigating factor, and accounted for the gravity of the crime, as well
as any aggravating circumstances in its sentence determination. Id. For a detailed
discussion of those factors see Id.
138-140, 152, 153-173, 194-199, 200-210,
230.
83 Id.
150.
84 Id.
85 Id. Cf CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 272 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) (noting that Civil Law
systems do not recognize the guilty plea concept, because it cannot be reconciled
with its maxim of truth-finding).
86 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
150
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
87 Id.
149.
88 Id. [[ 151, 193.
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transfer. 89 However, on 6 December 2001 Kolundlija, who had served two
years, six months and one day, was released. 90 The ICTY President granted
Kolund~ija's request for immediate release pursuant to article 28 of the
ICTY Statute, and rules 101(c) and 123-125 of the ICTY RPE.91 The President cited the defendant's mental health, his cooperation with the OTP, and
his behavior as a detainee as relevant factors. 92
III. HISTORY

A.

The Guilty Plea Concept and Its Use as a Mitigating Factor

Guilty pleas result in the immediate conviction of the accused, permitting the court to dispense with the trial and proceed directly to the sentencing phase of a case. 93 This concept is distinctly a feature of common
law systems, 94 where a great majority of guilty pleas are the result of the
Status of Cases Page, United Nations website for the ICTY, at www.un.org/
icty/latest/index.htm (last visited April 9, 2003).
90 "Order of the President on the Early Release of Dragen Kolund2ija," President,
30 ICTY JUDICIAL SUPPLEMENT (Dec. 2001), availableat www.un.org/icty/Supplement/supp30-e/index.htm.
91 Id. Article 28 establishes the President's power, in consultation with the judges,
to decide in the interests of justice and general principles of law to pardon or commutate a convicted person's sentence. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 28. RPE
rule 101(c) on penalties provides for the granting of credit to the convicted person
"for the period, if any, during which the convicted person was detained in custody
pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or appeal." ICTY RPE, supra
note 61, rule 101(c). RPE rules 123-125 provide the framework for granting pardons and commutations of sentences. Id. rules 123-125.
92 Press Release No. 646, United Nations website for the ICTY, at www.un.org/
icty/latestlindex.htm (last visited April 9, 2003). He was released on 6 December
2001. Id.
93 See SAFFERLING, supra note 85, at 272. See also Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, Vol. 1,
261-64, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
89

94

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 236, 251 (John Hatchard, Barbara Huber

& Richard Vogler eds., 1996). For example, the United States, England and Wales,
and Australia have formal guilty plea procedures. Id. Most civil law systems do
not recognize formal guilty pleas, which would result in a dispensation of the trial.
Id. See also Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic; Sentencing Judgment: A Questionable
Milestone for the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 26
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 263, 268-270 (1997); Michael Bohlander, Plea-Bargaining before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR
OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD 151 (Richard May, et al. eds., 2001). Even
though civil law countries do not recognize such a formal plea, most do provide for
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89

plea-bargaining process. 95 To provide context, in the United States, guilty
pleas account for over ninety percent of all convictions. 96 Moreover, pleading guilty is routinely recognized as a mitigation factor in sentence determination.97 Again drawing on the United States' practice, defendants who
plead guilty on average receive a sentence that is thirty to forty percent
lighter than it would have been had the conviction resulted from a trial. 98
Thus, often guilty pleas are an attempt to obtain a more lenient sentence
than one might otherwise receive. 99
B.

The Admissibility and the Procedure of Guilty Pleas Before the ICTY

1.

The Foundation

The Security Council of the United Nations established the ICTY in
Resolution 827 on 25 May 1993.100 With little comment in the travaux
an abbreviated or expedited trial procedure, especially in the case of confessions.
See COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra. For example in France this procedure is called the comparution immediate, and in Germany, the expedited procedure. Id. at 251.
95 Bohlander, supra note 94. Plea-bargaining is the negotiation between the prosecution and the defense to reach an outcome acceptable to both parties. Id. at 151.
This practice is accepted not only in common law systems, but most civil systems
as well, including Italy, Germany, and France. Id. See also COMPARATIVE CRIMIsupra note 94; LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE
NAL PROCEDURE,

NEW MILLENNIUM 235 (Transnational Publishers 2002). However, in the interest
of concise analysis, this paper does not examine the development, existence or
efficacy of this practice in the international criminal forum. For a discussion of

plea-bargaining in the international criminal forum, see Bohlander, supra note 94.
96

PETER

JUSTICE

F.

NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN &

Roy B.

FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF

203 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1988). See also JOHN

HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID
& JOHN 0. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA, CASES AND MATERIALS 1081 (Michie Co. 1994).
S.

CLARK

97 Olivia Swaak-Goldman, InternationalDecision: Kambanda v. Prosecutor.No.
ICTR 97-23-A, at http://www.ictr.org(last visited April 9, 2003). International

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, October 19, 2000, 95 AM.J.
INT'L L. 656, 660 (2001)(citing U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48
(1987)). See JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE:
PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY 15 n.2, 18-20 (1977) (discussing sentence mitigation
due to guilty pleas in England).

Swaak-Goldman, supra note 97, at 661.
99 Id.
100 S.C. Res. 827, SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (25 May 1993).
98
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01
priparatoires'
and providing little guidance for the Tribunal, the common
10 2
law concept of the guilty plea was introduced into the ICTY Statute.
Under the original framework of the ICTY, the legal foundation for accepting an accused's guilty plea in an international criminal tribunal was
ambiguous at best. As adopted the Statute of the ICTY never expressly
10 3
incorporated the guilty plea concept into the procedures of the Tribunal.
However, the ambiguous reference to entering a plea found in paragraph 3
of article 20, on the commencement and conduct of trial proceedings, does
indicate an intent to admit such pleas. 10 4 The article states, that "the Trial
Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands the indictment,
10 5
and instruct the accused to enter a plea."'
Furthermore, although article 15 of the ICTY Statute instructs the
judges to adopt rules of procedure and evidence, 10 6 as originally adopted on
11 February 1994107 the ICTY RPE provided very little guidance on the

See Comparative Chart of the Proposals for the Statute of the International Tribunal, in 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 363, 462
(1995). Volume 2 of Morris and Scharf's work reprints all relevant proposals of
states and organizations for the ICTY Statute. See 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra, at
209-506.
102 ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 20,
3.
103 Id. passim.
104 Id. art. 20,
3.
105 Id. art. 20,
3 (emphasis added). Article 24 of the Nuremburg Charter also
required the Tribunal to ask the accused to enter a plea. The Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 Aug. 1945, 8 U.N.T.S. 279, reprintedin
2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 101, at 680. See also 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 101, at 429. However, the Nuremburg Rules of Procedure did not establish
any further procedural framework on guilty pleas. Rules of Procedure (adopted 29
Oct. 1945), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 101, at 687.
106 See supra note 74.
107 At the time of this writing, the first version of the RPE had been amended
twenty-three times and comprises more than one hundred twenty rules. Rule 6
provides for the amendment of the RPE stating: "proposals for amendment of the
Rules may be made by a Judge, the Prosecutor or the Registrar and shall be adopted
if agreed to by not less than ten permanent Judges at a plenary meeting of the
Tribunal convened with notice of the proposal addressed to all Judges." ICTY
RPE, supra note 61, rule 6(A). The rules may be otherwise amended if unanimously approved by the permanent Judges, and amendments enter into force seven
days after they are officially issued, but can not operate to prejudice the rights of
101
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admissibility of guilty pleas or the procedure to be followed when an accused pleads guilty. Rule 62 on the initial appearance of the accused provided the only reference, noting simply that the Trial Chamber shall "call
upon the accused to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. '10 8
Finally, with regard to recognition of an accused's guilty plea as a
mitigating factor, the ICTY Statute and RPE were no more forthcoming.
Article 24 of the Statute governs the imposition of penalties and makes no
reference to an accused's guilty plea. 10 9 However, article 24(2) does instruct the Trial Chamber to take into account the gravity of the offense and
the individual circumstances of the person when imposing sentences. 10 In
addition, as originally adopted the ICTY RPE made no reference to the use
of an accused's guilty plea as a mitigating factor.11' Rule 101(B) on sentence determination instructs the Trial Chamber to account for any of the
factors set out in article 24, as well as any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and expressly includes "substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor" by the accused even after the conviction. 112 With the indictment and
initial appearance of Drazen Erdemovi6 in May 1996,113 it became evident
that these cursory references were insufficient, and that if such pleas were
admissible, the ICTY needed a definitive framework regarding their acceptance and role, not only to protect of the accused's rights, but to ensure the
advent of justice.
any accused, convicted or acquitted person in a pending case. Id. rule 6(B), (C), &
(D).
108

Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted on 11 February 1994, International

Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 2d Sess., rule 62 (iii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.1 (5 May
1994)[hereinafter ICTY RPE I]. An examination of the travaux relating to the
drafting of the RPE reveals that Rule 62 significantly tracks Rule 15 of the United
States' proposed Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY. Suggestions
made by the Government of the United States of America, Rules of Procedureand
Evidence for the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed
in the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in, 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 101, at
531.
109 ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 24.
110 ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 24.

111
ICTY RPE I, supra note 108, passim.
112

ICTY RPE 1, supra note 108, rule 101.

Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-T) Judgment, para. 3 (ICTY Trial
Chamber I, 29 Nov. 1996).
113
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Drazen Erdemovi6 was the first accused to avail himself of the
ICTY's implicit ability to by pass trial via a guilty plea.' 14 On 29 May
1996, the OTP indicted Erdemovi6 on one count of a crime against humanity 115 and an alternative count of a violation of the laws or customs of
war, 116 for the summary executions of hundreds of male Bosnian Muslim
civilians. n 7 At his initial appearance, pursuant to article 20(3) of the Statute and rule 62 of the RPE, Erdemovi6 pleaded guilty to the crime against
humanity charge, but added that he would have been killed for refusing to
participate in the execution.118 The Trial Chamber accepted the guilty plea,
and dismissed the violation of the laws or customs of war charge. 119 Recognizing the accused's guilty plea as a mitigating factor, 120 the Trial Chamber
122
sentenced Erdemovi6 to ten years imprisonment. 2 1 Erdemovi6 appealed,
and the Appeals Chamber seized the opportunity to determine the proper
construction of the references to the guilty plea concept as ascribed in the
Id.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
117 Id. The Erdemovi Case arose out of events occurring in Srebrenica, and the
massacres occurring at Pilica Farm. See also 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
114

115

ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL

AND NATIONAL COURTS

574-577 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-

Goldman eds., 2000) [hereinafter

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF IN-

TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].

Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, (Case No. IT-96-22-T) Sentencing Judgment,
10
(ICTY Trial Chamber I, 29 Nov. 1996).
119 Id.
3-21.
120 The Trial Chamber's sentence determination pursuant to articles 7 and 24(2),
and rule 101(B), accounted for both the extreme gravity of the offense and a number of mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea. Id. [ 42, 83-111.
The Trial Chamber divided the mitigating circumstances into circumstances contemporaneous with the crime, such as mental incompetence and duress, and circumstances following the commission of the crime, such as the accused's remorse,
his surrender, guilty plea and cooperation with the OTP, as well as his present
threat and the corrigible character of his personality. Id.
121
Id. N 3-21.
122 Erdemovi6 appealed on several grounds, and the appeals chamber raised three
preliminary issues proprio motu pursuant to its inherent powers as an appellate
body under article 25 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 25, including the
admissibility and validity of the accused's guilty plea. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6,
(Case No. IT-96-22-A) Judgment (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).
118
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Statute and the RPE. 123 Due to the ambiguity of both the Statute and the
RPE, the Appeals Chamber first examined the policy justifications for permitting guilty pleas. 124 It then established a definitive procedural framework for the Trial Chamber's acceptance of a guilty plea. 125
Analyzing the common law rationale for the guilty plea concept,
the Appeals Chamber determined that the policy justifications for guilty
pleas are even stronger in the international context. 26 The common law
policy justifications include minimizing public costs, conserving court resources and avoiding the inconvenience to witnesses of testifying. 127 According to the Appeals Chamber, the advantages of administrative
efficiency are even greater in the international criminal law forum because
of the inherently complex and lengthy nature of such cases and the stringent
financial constraints of the Tribunal. 28 Judge Cassesse, in his separate and
dissenting opinion elaborated further:
[In international proceedings,] it often proves extremely arduous and time consuming to collect evidence. In addition,
it is imperative for the relative officials of an international
court to fulfill the essential but laborious task of protecting
victims and witnesses. Furthermore, international criminal
proceedings are expensive, on account of the need to provide a host of facilities to the various parties concerned (simultaneous interpretation into various languages; provision
of transcripts for the proceedings, again in various languages; transportation of victims and witnesses from faraway countries; provision of various forms of assistance to
Id. The Appeals Chamber made three other findings in disposing of the Appeal.
Id. By unanimous vote, the Appeals Chamber rejected Erdemovi6's application for
acquittal; rejected his application for revision of his sentence; and found that duress
was not "a complete defense to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity
and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent civilians." Id. 17-20.
124 Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Joint and Separate Opinion of
123

Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,

2 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).

7-31
126 Id.; Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassesse, $ 7-9 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).
127 See SAFFERLING, supra note 85. See also 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 117, at 575.
128 Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Joint and Separate Opinion of
125

Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,

2 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997);

Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Separate and Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cassesse, [ 7-9 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).
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them during trial, etc.). Thus, by pleading guilty, the accused undoubtedly contributes to the public advantage. 129
In addition to administrative efficiency justifications, Judge Cassese
articulated the beneficial effects of guilty pleas on the accused as further
justification for their use in the international context. 130 First, such a plea
may help the accused to ease his conscience and "atone for his wrongdoing."' 3 Second, it allows the accused to "avoid the indignity and the possible demoralization of undergoing a trial, as well as the psychological ordeal
he would have to go through during examination and cross-examination of
witnesses."' 132 Moreover, the accused will avoid the "public exposure that
may ensue from trial."' 133 Finally, the accused may expect that "the court
will be more lenient in recognition of his admission of guilt."'1 34 For these
reasons, the Appeals Chamber recognized the admissibility of guilty pleas
13 5
in ICTY proceedings.
Next, in light of the fact that an accused forfeits several of his rights
under article 21 of the ICTY Statute by pleading guilty, the Appeals Chamber deemed it necessary to establish a procedural framework for the Trial
Chamber's acceptance of a guilty plea. 136 At common law, a guilty plea
renders the first stage of the trial superfluous because no more proof is
required to establish the defendant's guilt. 137 Therefore, through such a plea,
the accused automatically waives his right to a number of procedural safeguards built into the trial process. 13 8 Because of these immediate conseProsecutor v. Erdemovid, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassesse, 8 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
129

See id.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Judgment, [ 17-20 (ICTY
Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A)
Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, paras. 5-6
(ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-9622-A) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassesse, 8 (ICTY Appeals
Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997). See also 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 117.
136 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Joint Separate Opinion of
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 7 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).
137 See SAFFERLING, supra note 85, at 272.
138 Id. Specifically, the accused waives his right to a fair and public hearing; to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty; to examine or have examined witnesses on
134

135
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quences and to ensure that the accused's rights are not prejudiced, the
Appeals Chamber held that:
(a) The guilty plea must be voluntary. It must be made by
an accused who is mentally fit to understand the consequences of pleading guilty and who is not affected by
any threats, inducements, or promises.
(b) The guilty plea must be informed, that is, the accused
must understand the nature of the charges against him
and the consequences of pleading guilty to them. The
accused must know to what he is pleading guilty;
(c) The guilty plea must not be equivocal. It must not be
accompanied by words amounting to a defence contra139
dicting an admission of criminal responsibility.
Under this framework, the Appeals Chamber held that Erdemovi6's plea
40
was uninformed, and thus, invalid.
On remand, Erdemovi6 pleaded guilty to a violation of the laws or
customs of war, and the prosecutor withdrew the alternative charge of
crimes against humanity.' 4' Applying the guidelines of article 24 of the
his behalf; and "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt."
Id. These rights are derived from article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 14, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, and are expressly
recognized in article 21 of the ICTY Statute. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
See also Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Joint Separate Opinion
of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 7 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997).
139 Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Joint Separate Opinion of
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 11 8-19 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct.
1997). The Appeals Chamber derived this procedural framework from the common law jurisdictions of the world. Id. 9.
140 Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Judgment,
17-20 (ICTY
Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997). The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the plea was
not informed because the accused did not understand the consequences of pleading
to the more serious charge of crimes against humanity, rather than the war crimes
offense. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A) Joint Separate Opinion
of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, . 14-18 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct.
1997). Additionally, the Appeals Chamber unanimously held that the plea was
voluntary, and by majority held that the plea was not equivocal because duress does
not afford a complete defense. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-A)
Judgment, . 17-20 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997). For a detailed treatment of the ICTY's holding on this issue, See Yee, supra 94.
141 Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis) Sentencing Judgment,
911 (ICTY Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar. 1998).
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- From October 1952. It was argued that most of the human rights
violations and bad governance witnessed during the 40 years of Kenya's independent history were a direct result of colonialism. The
misrule was perpetuated by successive regimes. Therefore investigations ought to pre-date December 12 1963 to cover the declaration of emergency in Kenya.
- From 1980: A speaker was of the view that it was during this period
that human rights violations became pronounced and therefore
should be the beginning point for the truth commission.
- From 1978: Few speakers proposed that the truth commission investigate injustices committed during the Moi regime since cogent evidence would be available in a number of cases.
- From 1969: One speaker cited this year as the beginning of the deterioration of the rule of law and intense political repression.
- From 1885: Two speakers suggested that the truth commission revisit events from the partition of Africa by major imperial powers at
the Berlin Conference.

Other periods for which no concrete reasons were advanced are 1950, 1965,
1966, and 1970.
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guilty to murdering thirteen individuals, 156 severely beating, threatening and
subjecting to cruel treatment four individuals, 5 7 and stealing money from
detainees. 5 8 Before convicting the accused, the Trial Chamber held that
Jelesi's plea satisfied the requirements of rule 62 bis: that it was voluntary,
informed, and not equivocal (satisfying the requirements under the
Erdemovid Case), and engaged in a detailed analysis of the factual support
for each element of the crimes.15 9 The Trial Chamber sentenced Jelesi to
forty years imprisonment. 160 In its sentence determination, the Trial Chamber "out of principle" recognized Jelesi's guilty plea as a mitigating factor. 161 However, the Chamber further stated that it would accord this plea
162
only "relative weight."'
On 13 December 2000 pursuant to an agreement between the parties, Stevan Todorovic pleaded guilty to the crime against humanity of persecution set out in Count 1 of the indictment and the OTP dropped the
remaining twenty-seven counts against the accused including deportation
and transfer, killing, beatings, sexual assaults and torture. 163 On 19 January
2001 having satisfied itself that the conditions of rule 62 bis were met, the
Trial Chamber entered a finding of guilty on the basis of the Todorovic's
guilty plea. 164 The Trial Chamber sentenced Todorovic to ten years imprisonment. 165 In its sentence determination, the Trial Chamber considered the
accused's timely guilty plea of primary importance, and stated that the accused would have received a significantly longer sentence absent this
66
plea. 1
156

Prosecutor v. Jelesi, (Case No. IT-95-10-T) Judgment,

37-40 (ICTY Trial

Chamber I, 14 Dec. 1999).
Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
157

41-45.

158

46-49.
25-58.
139.
127.

Id.
127, 136-139. The Appeals Chamber reaffirmed the Trial Chamber's
sentence determination and the discretionary weight accorded the accused's guilty
121-122 (ICTY
plea. Prosecutor v. Jelesi, (Case No. IT-95-10-A) Judgment,
162

Appeals Chamber, 5 July 2000).

Prosecutor v. Todorovic, (Case No. IT-95-9/1) Sentencing Judgment, 9, 1617 (ICTY Trial Chamber I, 31 July 2001). At his initial appearance on 30 September 1998, Todorovic pleaded not guilty to all counts. Id. 2.
164 Id. 17.
165 Id. 115. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the OTP recommended a sentence of
not less than five years and not more than twelve years imprisonment. Id. 11.
163

166

Id.

114.
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The Admissibility and Procedureof Guilty Pleas before the ICTR.

The ICTR, pursuant to article 19 of the ICTR Statute 167 and rule 62
of the ICTR RPE, 168 also recognizes the admissibility of guilty pleas. The
Security Council established the ICTR in Resolution 955 on 8 November
1994.169 The establishment of the ICTR followed that of the ICTY by just
eighteen months. 170 Thus, the ICTR's Statute and RPE are significantly
similar to those of the ICTY. 17 1 Notably, the ambiguity with respect to the
admissibility and procedures of guilty pleas were similarly adopted into the
ICTR Statute and RPE. In particular, the language of article 19(3) tracks
article 20(3) of the ICTY Statute, and the language of ICTR RPE rule 62
tracks rule 62 of the ICTY RPE. 172 However, the ICTR had the opportunity
to reap the benefits of its status as the "younger sibling." Drawing on the
experiences of the ICTY in the Erdemovie Case, the ICTR amended its
RPE to fill the lacunae as to the effects of an accused's guilty plea before
ever having faced a defendant's guilty plea. 173 At the fifth plenary session,
Rule 62(v) was amended to include the pre-conditions of the ICTY's rule
62 bis.174 In addition, the ICTR's sentencing procedures found in article 23
of the ICTR Statute and rule 101 of the ICTR RPE tract article 24 and rule
101 of the ICTY Statute and RPE. 175 Thus, neither expressly recognizes
176
guilty pleas as a mitigating factor.

167 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (8 Nov. 1994)[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The complete text of the ICTR Statute is available at <http://
www.un.org/ictr/>(last visited April 9, 2003).
168 ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (1995)[hereinafter ICTR RPE].
169 S.C. Res. 955, SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (8 Nov.
1994).
170 See supra note 100.
171 See generally JONES, supra note 149.
172 See JONES, supra note 149, at 99, 217.
173 Jean Kambanda was the first accused to plead guilty before the ICTR. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, (Case No. ICTR-97-23-S) Judgment and Sentence (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, 4 Sept. 1998).
174 ICTR RPE, supra note 168, rule 62(v). For the language of ICTY RPE rule 62
bis see supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
175 See generally JONES, supra note 149.
176 See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
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To date, three defendants have availed themselves of the ICTR's
guilty plea option. 177 On 1 May 1998 at his initial appearance, Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of Rwanda throughout the genocide, pleaded
guilty to six counts of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and the
crimes against humanity of murder and extermination. 178 After verifying
the validity of the plea under rule 62(v) of the ICTR RPE, the Trial Chamber convicted the accused of all six counts.179 The Trial Chamber, pursuant
180
to article 23(2) of the ICTR Statute and rule 101(B) of the ICTR RPE,
18 1
In its sentence determination,
sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, (Case No. ICTR-97-23-S) Judgment and Sentence, [
3 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 4 Sept. 1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M 1411; Prosecutor v.
Serushago, (Case No. ICTR-98-39-S) Sentence, 4 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 5 Feb.
1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 854; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, (Case No. ICTR-97-32-I)
4-7 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 1 June 2000) reprinted in
Judgment and Sentence,
39 I.L.M. 1338.
178 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, (Case No. ICTR-97-23-S) Judgment and Sentence, [
3 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 4 Sept. 1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M 1411. Jean Kamanda was the Prime Minister from 8 April 1994 to 17 July 1994. Id. [ 39. He
was a member of the Council of Ministers exercising de jure authority and control
of Rwandan government throughout this time, and he personally exercised de jure
and de facto authority over senior civil servants and military officers. Id. He admits to issuing a directive that encouraged and reinforced the actions of the Interahamwe, who were committing mass killings of the Tutsi civilian population. Id.
He further admitted to using the media as part of the plan to mobilize and incite the
massacres; to supplying with weapons, training and directing the groups who committed the massacres; and to establishing the roadblocks used to trap and kill the
Tutsi. Id. Moreover, he admitted to refusing to protect a hospital of children who
were killed. Id.
179 Id.
[ 4-7.
180 Article 23(2) of the ICTR Statute and rule 101(B) of the ICTR RPE are identical to article 24(2) and rule 101(B) of the ICTY Statute and RPE. See supra notes
80-81. See also JONES, supra note 149, at 113, 316.
181 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, (Case No. ICTR-97-23-S) Judgment and Sentence,
Section IV (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 4 Sept. 1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1411.
Kambanda filed eight grounds of appeal, but the Appeals Chamber rejected all
eight grounds, affirming the Trial Chamber's decision. Prosecutor v. Kambanda,
(Case No. ICTR-97-23-A) Judgment (ICTR Appeals Chamber, 19 Oct. 2000).
Grounds three and four attacked the validity of Kambanda's guilty plea and the
Trial Chamber's failure to apply his guilty plea as a mitigating factor which would
discount his sentence. Id. 10. The Appeals Chamber held that Kambanda was
procedurally barred from contesting the validity of the guilty plea for the first time
at the Appeals level. Id. [ 55. However, noting that the Appeals Chamber is the
177
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the Trial Chamber recognized that an accused's guilty plea is generally considered a mitigating factor by most national jurisdictions, including
Rwanda, and that it is also a mitigating factor in the ICTY. I8 2 Moreover,
the Trial Chamber noted that the recognition of guilty pleas as mitigating
factors likely encourages others to recognize their responsibilities regarding
the events in Rwanda. 18 3 However, the Trial Chamber ultimately held that
the intrinsic gravity of the crime and the aggravating circumstances 184 outweighed any mitigating factors. 85
On 14 December 1998 at his initial appearance, Omar Serushago
pleaded guilty to one count of genocide, and three counts of crimes against
humanity, 186 namely murder, extermination, and torture. 187 Serushago
pleaded not guilty to Count 5, the crime against humanity of rape, and the
OTP withdrew this count. 188 After verifying the validity of the plea under
rule 62(v) of the ICTR RPE, the Trial Chamber convicted the accused of
Counts 1-4.189 Pursuant to article 23(2) of the ICTR Statute and rule 101(B)
of the ICTR RPE, 190 the Trial Chamber sentenced Serushago to one term of
court of last resort, it considered and dismissed this ground on the merits. Id. paras.
49-95. With respect to Kambanda's fourth ground, the Appeals Chamber held that
the sentence was not "outside the discretionary framework of the Trial Chamber,"
and that the Trial Chamber had properly taken into account the mitigating factors.
Id.

96-126.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, (Case No. ICTR-97-23-S) Judgment and Sentence,
para. 61(A)(ii), (iii) (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 4 Sept. 1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M
1411.
183 Id.
184 The Trial Chamber outlined the following as aggravating circumstances: (1)
Kambanda, as Prime Minister of Rwanda was entrusted with the duty and authority
to protect the population, (2) he abused this trust and (3) he committed these crimes
knowingly and with premeditation. Id.
61(B)(vi), (vii).
185 Id.
62.
186 Article 3 of the ICTR Statute criminalizes crimes against humanity. ICTR Statute, supra note 167, art. 3. The enumerated crimes in both article 3 of the ICTR
Statute and article 5 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 44, are identical. For a discussion on the differences between the definition of crimes against humanity in the
ICTR and the ICTY see JoNEs, supra note 149, at 60.
187 Prosecutor v. Serushago, (Case No. ICTR-98-39-S) Sentence,
4 (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, 5 Feb. 1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M 854.
188 Id.
189 Id. 5.
190 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
182
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fifteen years imprisonment for all counts. 191 In its sentence determination,
the Trial Chamber, relying on the Erdemovi6 Case, recognized the accused's guilty plea as a mitigating factor. 192 Specifically, the Chamber
stated that "the exceptional circumstances in mitigation [including the accused's guilty plea] . . .may afford him some clemency." 193

On 15 May 2000, Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian journalist, pleaded
guilty to incitement to commit genocide and the crime against humanity of
persecution. 194 After verifying the validity of the plea under rule 62(v) of
the ICTR RPE, the Trial Chamber convicted the accused of Counts 1 and
2.195 Pursuant to article 23(2) and rule 101(B), 196 the Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years imprisonment for both Counts. 197 In its sentence determination, the Trial Chamber recognized the accused's guilty plea

191Prosecutor v. Serushago, (Case No. ICTR-98-39-S) Sentence, Section V (ICTR
Trial Chamber I, 5 Feb. 1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M 854.
192 Id. paras.
35-41. Pursuant to article 23(2) and rule 101, the Trial Chamber
also accounted for the gravity of the offense, the individual circumstances of the
convicted person, the aggravating circumstances and several other mitigating circumstances including his co-operation with the OTP, his character, his regret and
remorse, and his assistance to victims. Id. 1 31-40.
193Id. 42. Serushago appealed this sentence determination arguing that the Trial
Chamber did not give due weight to the mitigating factors and that the sentence
was excessive. Prosecutor v. Serushago, (Case No. ICTR-98-39-A) Reasons for
Judgment, 6 (ICTR Appeals Chamber, 6 Apr. 2000). The Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal. Id. 34. The Chamber reasoned that the Trial Chamber's sentence determination may be disturbed for according undue weight to mitigating
factors, only if the appellant shows that: (a) the Trial Chamber either took into
account what it ought not to have, or failed to take into account what it ought to
have, taken into account in the weighing process involved in this exercise of the
discretion; and, (b) if it did, that this resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Id. 23.
The Appeals Chamber then held that Serushago had not met this burden. Id.
194 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, (Case No. ICTR-97-32-I) Judgment and Sentence, 4-7
(ICTR Trial Chamber I, 1 June 2000) reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1338. At his initial
appearance in October 1999, Ruggiu pleaded not guilty to both counts. Id. 4.
The change in plea resulted from a plea agreement entered into between the parties.
Id. 6-7.
195 Id.
10-24.
196 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
197 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, (Case No. ICTR-97-32-I) Judgment and Sentence, Sec-

tion IV (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 1 June 2000) reprinted in 39 I.L.M 1338. The
OTP recommended a sentence of twenty years. Id. 81.
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as a mitigating factor. 198 The Chamber reasoned that guilty pleas facilitate
the administration of justice by expediting proceedings and saving resources because they spare the Tribunal lengthy and expensive investigations and trials, which in turn economizes time, effort and resources. 9 9 The
Trial Chamber further reasoned that in this case the accused's plea reflects
the genuine awareness of guilt, which illustrates the beginning of repentance. 200 Finally, citing the Erdemovie Case, the Chamber noted that allowing guilty pleas to mitigate sentences encourages other suspects to come
forward.
D.

201

The Admissibility and Procedure of Guilty Pleas Before the ICC

The admission of guilty pleas, as recognized in common law justice
systems, the ICTY and the ICTR, proved quite contentious in the development of the Statute for the International Criminal Court. 202 Recognizing the
administrative efficiency of this concept, the drafters were also acutely
aware of the negative effects of such pleas. 20 3 First, guilty pleas are often
extracted from defendants through coercive means. 20 4 Second, especially in
the context of mass atrocities, the criminal trials also serve as an official
venue for the acknowledgement of the victims' injuries and the making of
the historical record.20 5 Finally, the efficacy of plea-bargaining, a natural

Id.
53-55. Pursuant to article 23(2) and rule 101, the Trial Chamber also
accounted for the gravity of the offense, the individual circumstances of the convicted person, the aggravating circumstances and several other mitigating circumstances including his co-operation with the OTP, his character, his lack of a prior
record, regret and remorse, his assistance to victims, his lack of personal participation in the killings and his position as a low-level employee. Id. [ 56-80.
198

199 Id.

53.

200

Id.
Id.

54.
201
55.
202 SADAT, supra note 95, at 235; see also Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati,
From the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407, 454 (2001).
203 SADAT, supra note 95, at 235-36.
204

Id.

205

Id. at 236.
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(and actual) 20 6 consequence of the guilty plea, is questionable at best in this
207
context.
Acknowledging the advantages and disadvantages of such pleas,
the drafters established a compromise between the common and the civil
law approaches.208 The ICC will permit, but does not require the accused to
enter a plea. 20 9 Article 64(8)(a) states in pertinent part that the Trial Chamber shall "afford [the accused] the opportunity to make an admission of
guilt in accordance with article 65 or to plead not guilty. '2 10 Moreover,
under the procedures outlined in article 65, an admission of guilt must be
approved by the Trial Chamber to result in an immediate conclusion of the
proceedings. 2 1 Similar to the procedures under rule 62 bis of the ICTY
RPE and rule 62(v) of ICTR RPE, under article 65 the Trial Chamber must
The outcome of the Erdemovi6 Case was achieved through an agreement between the accused and the OTP in which the OTP agreed to drop the more serious
charge of crimes against humanity in exchange for Erdemovi6's guilty plea to the
lesser crime of violations of the laws or customs of war. Prosecutorv. Erdemovi6,
(Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis) Sentencing Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar.
1998). See supra notes 114-148 and accompanying text.
207 Id. See also Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 202, at 454.
208 SADAT, supra note 95, at 236-37.
209 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 64(8), 65, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998)[hereinafter Rome Statute], available at <http://www.un.org/
law/icc/statute/romefra.htm>(last visited April 9, 2003). See also SADAT, supra
note 95, at 236-37.
210 Rome Statute, supra note 209, art. 64(8)(a).
211 Id. art. 65. Article 65 provides:
206

1. Where the accused makes an admission of guilt pursuant to
article 64, paragraph 8(a), the Trial Chamber shall determine
whether:
(a) The accused understands the nature and consequences of
the admission of guilt;
(b) The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after
sufficient consultation with defence counsel; and
(c) The admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the
case that are contained in:
(i) The charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted
by the accused;
(ii) Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which
supplement the charges and which the accused accepts; and
(iii) Any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, presented by the Prosecutor or the accused.
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assess whether the accused truly understands the nature and consequences
of the admission of guilt, and the voluntariness of the admission. 212 In addition, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case in order to convict the accused. 213 If the Trial
Chamber considers these criteria to have been met, it may convict the accused, 2 14 or may decide in the interest of justice, a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required. 215 Thus, as provided in article 65(4)
the Trial Chamber may order a summary proceeding involving the presentation of additional evidence by the Prosecutor or the actual trial. 216 Moreover, if the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the criteria of article 65(1) are
217
met, then the case proceeds to trial and the accused is presumed innocent.
Where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the matters referred
to in paragraph 1 are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt, together with any evidence presented, as establishing all the essential facts that are required to prove the
crime to which the admission of guilt relates, and may convict the accused of that crime.
3. Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 are established, it shall consider the
admission of guilt as not having been made. ...
4. Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the
interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims,
the Trial Chamber may:
(a) Request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence,
including the testimony of witnesses; or
(b) Order that the trial be continued... in which case it shall
consider the admission of guilt as not having been made
and may remit the case to another Trial Chamber.
5. Any discussion between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or
the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court.

2.

Id.
Id. art. 65(1)(a), (b).
Id. art. 65(1)(c).
214 Id. art. 65(2).
215 Id. art. 65(4).
216 Id. art. 65(4)(a),(b)
217 Id. art. 65(3). This was the result in the case of Dragoljub Kunarac before the
ICTY, where the Trial Chamber and the parties agreed that the requirements of rule
62 bis had not been met, and the case proceeded to trial on a presumption of inno212
213
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Finally, under the ICC's guilty plea procedures the accused recognizes no definite advantage from the Trial Chamber's acceptance of the
admission. 218 Article 78(1) on determination of the sentence 2 19 tracks article 24(2) and article 23(2) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively. 220
In addition, rule 145 on determination of sentence in the ICC's Rules of
Evidence and Procedure ("ICC RPE") does not expressly recognize the accused's admission of guilt as a mitigating factor.22 1 Thus, although it is
possible for such a plea to be accounted for in the sentence determination,
paragraph 5 of article 65 expressly states that the Trial Chamber is not
bound by any agreements between the parties regarding modification of the
222
charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed.
III.

CRITIQUE OF THE SIKIRICA CASE

In the Sikirica Case, Trial Chamber III consistently applied the
ICTY RPE and prior case law in its evaluation and acceptance of the defendants' guilty pleas. However, the Trial Chamber's recognition and use
of these pleas as mitigating factors was inconsistent not only with prior case
law, but with the rationale for allowing guilty pleas to mitigate sentences.
Pursuant to the guilty pleas of all three accused, Trial Chamber III convicted Sikirica, Dogen, and Kolundfija each of one count of persecution, the
crime against humanity, and permitted the OTP's withdrawal of all other
counts against the three defendants. 223 The Trial Chamber's evaluation and
acceptance of these guilty pleas consistently applied the procedural requirements of rule 62 bis, thereby ensuring the protection of the defendants'
rights and determined that under this framework their guilty pleas were
valid.2 2 4 The Trial Chamber did not expressly recognize any precedent 225 in

cence. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, (Case No. IT-96-23-I) Transcript
(ICTY Trial Chamber II, March 13, 1998). See supra note 153.
218 See Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 202, at 455.
219 Rome Statute, supra note 209, art. 78(1).
220 See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
221 Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the Intemational Criminal Court, 23rd mtg., rule 145,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1 (30 June 2000)[hereinafter ICC RPE].
222 Rome Statute, supra note 209, art. 65(5).
223 See supra notes 69, 72 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 69, 72 and accompanying text. For purposes of this paper, the
focus is on the admissibility of the guilty plea itself and not the substantive application of the various pre-conditions in rule 62 bis. Thus, the author undertakes
neither a detailed analysis of the court's evaluation of the voluntary, informed and
unequivocal factors, nor its assessment of the facts.
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its decision to apply rule 62 bis. 2 26 However, rule 62 bis embodies the
procedural framework for allowing and accepting guilty pleas as determined in the Erdemovid Appeal,22 7 and thus, the Trial Chamber's acceptance of the defendants' pleas after application of rule 62 bis is a de facto
reliance on the Erdemovi6 Appeal.
However, the Trial Chamber's recognition and use of these pleas as
mitigating factors flies in the face of the rationale for allowing guilty pleas
to mitigate sentences. The Trial Chamber sentenced Dusko Sikirica to fifteen years imprisonment, Damir Dogen to five years imprisonment, and
Dragen Kolundija to three years imprisonment.2 2 8 In its sentence determination the Trial Chamber recognized the defendants' guilty pleas as mitigating factors.2 2 9 The Trial Chamber reasoned that such pleas facilitate the
work of the ICTY in two ways. First, such pleas contribute to the public
advantage if entered prior to the commencement of trial because they save
the ICTY the time and effort of an extensive investigation and trial.2 30 This
is the primary policy justification Judges McDonald, Vohrah, and Cassese
in the Erdemovi6 Appeal cited at length as support for the admissibility of
the guilty plea concept in the international criminal context. 23 1 It is important to note that the Appeals Chamber in the Erdemovi6 Appeal did not rely
on this justification in the context of the guilty plea as a mitigating factor.
It was Trial Chamber II, in the ErdemoviW Case following the appeal, which
recognized this justification in the mitigation context only after first noting
the inherent demonstration of honesty in such pleas and the fact that their
2 32
Second, relying on
use in mitigation encourages others to come forward.
the Todorovic Case the Trial Chamber stated that such pleas contribute to
the truth-finding function of the ICTY. 233 On its face this a correct statement. However, in Todorovic the Trial Chamber gave only cursory reference to this justification and rested its decision to allow the guilty plea as a
For purposes of this paper the term precedent connotes not binding precedent as
in common law jurisdictions, but rather the persuasive prior case authority of the
ICTR and ICTY.
226 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes77-79 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
230 See Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment,
149 (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001); see also supra note 86.
231 See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
233 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-S) Sentencing Judgment, [ 149
(ICTY Trial Chamber III, 13 Nov. 2001).
225
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mitigating factor on the fact that the accused entered his plea prior to the
commencement of the trial, and as such, saved all involved the considerable
effort, time and cost of a lengthy trial. 23 4
Sikirica presented a case of first impression with respect to the
weight accorded an accused's guilty plea when entered after the commencement of trial. In all prior cases before both the ICTY and the ICTR, the
accused entered their guilty pleas before the commencement of trial. 235 In
the Sikirica Case, Kolundlija entered his plea after the close of the OTP's
case but prior to the presentation of his defense. Additionally, both Sikirica
and Dogen entered their pleas subsequent to the presentation of not only the
OTP's case, but their defenses. The Trial Chamber noted the lateness of the
pleas, but still afforded all three accused at least "some credit," resting on
the justification that guilty pleas assist in the truth-finding functions of the
court. However, as stated above the primary policy justification for even
allowing the common law concept of guilty pleas (which allows one to
automatically by-pass the trial stage) is administrative efficiency. The
ICTY considers this justification to be even stronger in the international
criminal context because of the unique administrative difficulties faced by
such courts. As such, their use as a mitigating factor, which in turn encourages others to come forward and plead guilty, is encouraged. As the Trial
Chamber noted in the Torodovic Case, when an accused avails himself of
this procedure after commencement of the trial this rationale no longer applies. Thus, such untimely pleas should not be permitted to mitigate an
accused's sentence, despite their truth-finding benefit.

Prosecutor v. Todorovic, (Case No. IT-95-9/1) Sentencing Judgment, 114
(ICTY Trial Chamber I, 31 July 2001). See also supra note 166 and accompanying
text.
235 Guilty pleas were entered at the initial appearances of Erdemovi6, Kambanda,
and Serushago. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, (Case No. IT-96-22-T) Sentencing Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber I, 29 Nov. 1996); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, (Case No.
ICTR-97-23-S) Judgment and Sentence (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 4 Sept. 1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M 1411, and Prosecutor v. Serushago, (Case No. ICTR-98-39-S)
Sentence (ICTR Trial Chamber I, 5 Feb. 1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M 854. However, Jelesi (9 months after initial appearance), Todorovic (26 months after initial
appearance), and Ruggui (13 months after initial appearance) did enter their pleas
prior to the commencement of trial. Prosecutor v. Jelesi, (Case No. IT-95-10-T)
Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber I, 14 Dec. 1999); Prosecutor v. Todorovic, (Case
No. IT-95-9/1) Sentencing Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber I, 31 July 2001); Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, (Case No. ICTR-97-32-I) Judgment and Sentence (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, 1 June 2000) reprinted in 39 I.L.M 1338.
234
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CONCLUSION

The common law concept of guilty pleas surreptitiously found its
way into the procedures of the ICTY, and has remained there because of the
strong administrative value it poses to the tribunal. However, in the
Erdemovi6 Appeal, Judge Cassesse also noted at length the beneficial effects that such pleas have on the accused as further justification for their use
in the international context. 23 6 The author takes issue with this justification
in light of the fundamental goals of the tribunal. The international community established the ICTY and the ICTR primarily to hold accountable those
guilty of the most heinous crimes known to humankind. Therefore, acknowledgement of the benefits to these offenders has no place as a justification for accepting or rejecting the guilty plea concept in the international
criminal forum. Furthermore, the benefits of a trial, to the victims and the
public as a whole, of holding the offender publicly accountable for the commission of such crimes 237 and establishing an accurate historical record, 23 8
argue strongly against permitting guilty pleas, which allow an accused to
bypass trial and proceed directly to the sentencing phase.
Even recognizing the substantial administrative benefits of timely
guilty pleas and the encouraging effect their use in mitigation may have on
other accused or suspected individuals to come forward, the author nonetheless struggles to justify what is essentially an allowance of administrative
concerns to mitigate the punishment of those convicted for the most heinous
crimes known to humankind! Moreover, even if one accepts the appropriateness of these concepts in this context, in the Sikirica Case the guilty
pleas should not have been recognized as mitigating factors. In Sikirica, the
benefits of the untimely pleas were not substantial enough to outweigh the
extreme gravity of the crimes in question, and as was held by the ICTR in
236

See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.

Criminological research of national legal systems indicates that victims care
about not only the severity of the sentence, but also the public confirmation that
237

they were wronged by the accused. Bohlander, supra note 94, at 162.

The Sikirica Case is a prime example of the negative effect guilty pleas (especially those resulting in the OTP's dismissal of other charges in exchange for the
guilty plea) can have on establishing historiographic accuracy. Although the record
clearly establishes the factual circumstances occurring at the Keraterm Camp, it is
difficult to discern from the opinion the defendants' exact roles in those events
(specifically with respect to the Room three massacre). See supra note 38 and
accompanying text. Thus, not only is the historical record unclear, but also the
victims are deprived the satisfaction of public acknowledgment and accountability,
all because the accused availed themselves of the guilty plea procedure.
238
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the Kambanda Case, should therefore not have been allowed to mitigate the
sentences of the accused.
It seems the ICTY, and potentially the ICTR, are on a slippery
slope which began with the admittance of a purely common law concept
into the international criminal forum, and it is important to recognize the
danger this path poses to the goals of the tribunals. If these concepts are
going to be accepted in this context, then it is imperative that the judges
maintain a watchful eye and exercise the utmost scrutiny in determining
whether to allow such pleas to mitigate sentences, thereby ensuring adherence to the primary goals of the tribunals and the underlying rationale for
permitting such mitigation. The drafters of the Rome Statute recognized
the disadvantages of accepting the common law concept of guilty pleas
wholesale and devised a compromise that provides more opportunity for
ICC judges to scrutinize these processes. 239 ICC judges have the power to
force defendants who plead guilty to endure at least some form of trial
proceedings if the interests of justice require. 240 Thus, providing the judges
with the ability to choose the interests of the victims in public accountability and the goal of historiographic accuracy over the accused's desire to
bypass trial and proceed to the sentencing phase. Moreover, just like their
counterparts in the ICTY and ICTR, judges in the ICC will have the ability
to refuse to mitigate an accused's sentence; these judges should not hesitate
to exercise this authority when the underlying rationale for permitting mitigation is absent, as in the Sikirica Case, or where the aggravating circumstances, such as the heinous nature of the crimes involved, outweigh any
mitigating factors. With the advent of the ICC 24 1 and the significant number of cases still pending before the ICTY and the ICTR, it is important that
the judges take heed of the danger cases like Sikirica pose to the overarching goals of these institutions and with renewed vigor work to protect these
goals when an accused avails himself of the tribunal's guilty plea
procedures.
239
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See supra notes 202-222 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202-222 and accompanying text.

On 11 April 2002, the sixtieth country ratified the Rome Statute and it entered
into force on 1 July 2002. See Ratification Status, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Website, at <www.un.org/law/icc>(last visited April 9, 2003).
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